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Abstract
Problems faced by empirical studies of the purchasing power pa­
rity (PPP) hypothesis are: the choice between a multilateral and 
a bilateral approach, the choice of the appropriate price index and 
the problem of simultaneous determination of prices and exchange 
rates. In the present paper, we analyse the implications that these 
problems have, while testing for the PPP doctrine between Greece 
and its three major trading partners during the recent floating ex­
change rate period. Long-run PPP is tested as an exchange rate- 
price cointegrating relationship by applying a multivariate maxi­
mum likelihood procedure, using two alternative price measures.
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Purchasing power parity (PPP) states that the exchange rate between two 
currencies is determined by the change in the two countries’ relative prices. 
The notion underlying this is that deviations from the parity represent 
profitable commodity arbitrage opportunities which, if exploited, will tend 
to force the exchange rate towards the parity. Since the return to a floating 
exchange rate regime in the early 70’s. PPP has been used as at least a long 
run relationship in most of the international economic models as much as it 
has been the focal point of exchange rate policy (see inter alia Dornbusch
(1988) , MacDonald and Taylor (1992)). As a consequence, its empirical 
verification as cither a short run or a long run relationship has been the 
purpose of a large number of applied papers, with cointegration analysis 
(introduced by Engle and Granger (1987)), used in the most recent ones as 
an important tool to test for its existence in the long run. In general, the 
empirical evidence in favour of the PPP condition has been rather weak 
(see Dornbush (1989)). In addition, most of the empirical works of the 
PPP hypothesis present a few common problems which are essentially the 
choice between a multilateral and a bilateral approach, the choice of the 
price index and the problem of the simultaneous determination of prices 
and exchange rates.
The two most recent studies which analyse PPP using Greek data 
during the recent floating exchange rate period are Karfakis and Moschos
(1989) and Dockery and Gcorgellis (1994)1. In both papers the authors use 
the Engle and Granger (1987) two step technique and adopt the bilateral 
approach for testing for PPP. Karfakis and Moschos (1989) use quarterly 
unadjusted scries for the exchange rates and two alternative price measures 
of Greece and its six major trading partners for the period 1975(1 )-1987(1); 
they find no evidence of long run PPP. Dockery and Gcorgellis use monthly 
unadjusted series for nine European trade partners of Greece for the post 
EEC period 1980(4)-1992(8); they use consumer prices and again they find
1 While Georgoutsos and Kouretas (1992) test for long run PPP between Greece and 



























































































no evidence of long run PPP in most cases2.
The present paper extends the existing literature on long run PPP 
for the Greek drachma by giving particular emphasis to the methodological 
problems presented in the literature. Long run PPP between Greece and 
its three major trading partners is tested as a cointegrated equilibrium re­
lationship, by making use of two alternative price measures, the consumer 
price index pc and the wholesale price index pw. The analysis is initially 
made in a multilateral framework in an effort to capture the bilateral bias 
(the fact that the bilateral analysis does not take into account the corre­
lation between exchange rate movements). In a second step, the strength 
of the bilateral specifications is evaluated by formal testing against the 
general multicountry models. Finally, PPP is tested in bilateral systems 
and the results obtained arc compared with the multilateral ones.
Both multilateral and bilateral analyses are performed in a multiva­
riate framework which is consistent with the “general to specific'’ tradi­
tion. Initially vector autoregressive (VAR) models in levels arc considered, 
which describe the statistical properties of the data. Then, the Johansen 
(1988), Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration technique is applied, 
which leads to the determination of the number of the cointegrating long 
run relationships and allows testing for the hypotheses of interest expres­
sed as linear restrictions on the cointegrating parameters3. The basic ad­
vantage of the methodology compared in particular with the Engle and 
Granger’s (1987) residual based technique used in the aboved mentioned 
studies of the Greek experience, is that it allows for possible interactions in 
the determination of the variables and no variable has to be considered a 
priori exogenous. In addition, the model specification used for cointegra­
tion allows for different long run relations and short run dynamics and for 
adjustment for specific regime shifts which may have occurred during the 
examined period; this is important since such shifts can distort statistical
2In particular, they find no evidence for PPP for the countries Germany, France. 
Italy, Belgium, Holland and Denmark, while they find PPP evidence for the countries 
UK, Spain and Portugal.
3Testing for PPP for main exchange rates using the Johansen methodology has 
provided new results (see inter alia Johansen and Juselius(1992), Hunter (1992), Cheung 




























































































tests that do not account for them. Finally, it allows for more than one 
cointegrating vector.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes 
briefly the theory underlying the PPP doctrine and outlines the problems 
related to the empirical PPP literature. Section 3 gives an overview of 
the econometric methodology applied, while in Section 4 the data set is 
presented. Sections 5 and 6 analyse the applied work done in a multilateral 
and a bilateral framework respectively, and interpret the results. The final 
section summarises and concludes.
2 The existing literature.
2.1 The economic background
PPP states a theory of exchange rate determination. Letting p. pj indicate 
the logs of the price levels of the domestic and the foreign economy respec­
tively, and e be the log of the exchange rate denominated in the currency 
of the domestic economy, the “strong” PPP version states that:
e — P ~ Pf (1)
implying that, whatever the monetary or real disturbances in an economy, 
under the assumption of instantaneous costless arbitrage, the prices of 
a common basket of goods in the two countries measured in a common 
currency will be the same.
However, even though there cannot be any objection to (1 ) as a 
theoretical statement, it cannot be expected to hold always as an empiri­
cal proposition. The prices of a given commodity wall not necessarily be 
equal in different locations, because of transportation costs, possible tariff 
barriers and information costs. Moreover, measurement error problems, 
arising from published price indices not coinciding with the theoretical 
prices, should also be taken into account when PPP is tested empirically4.




























































































Therefore the relationship is more likely to take the following “weak” 
PPP form:
e =  y ( p - p f )  (2 )
with 7 being a constant factor which accounts for assumed constant trans­
portation, information costs and measurement errors. In (2), 7  is allowed 
to differ from unity, implying that long run proportionality between the 
exchange rate and relative prices may not be exactly one-to-one (see Tay­
lor (1988), for the derivation of (2) in a model allowing for transportation 
costs and measurement errors).
However, even in its weak form (2), PPP does not necessarily hold 
in the long run, given that changes in tastes cause shifts in exports de­
mand, the different relevant importance of the tradeable to the nontradca- 
ble sectors, as well as the difference in more fundamental factors such as 
productivity, government spending and stategic pricing decisions by firms 
would cause exchange rate movements beyond the PPP level (sec Froot and 
Rogoff (1995) for a survey of the structural models that explain deviations 
from PPP).
Finally, exchange rates are also determined through transactions in 
the asset markets, related to the interest rate differentials between diffe­
rent countries. (For that reason, Johansen and Juselius (1992a), McDonald 
and Marsh (1995) suggest testing for PPP in a framework which includes 
interest rates, in an attempt to capture any special financial market ef­
fects). Therefore, temporary departures from PPP can be explained by 
asset markets clearing faster than commodity markets, thus leading to 
exchange rates being temporarily influenced by “news” effects.
2.2 Empirical problems.
The main problems of the empirical PPP literature (sec inter aha Giovan- 
netti (1992)) arc:
that each good is equally weighted in the indices of the different economies. Internatio­
nal differences in consumption patterns, variations in product qualities and differences 





























































































1. A bilateral versus a multilateral approach: Bilateral testing 
for PPP has often been criticised for ignoring the correlation between ex­
change rate movements. Dealing with this problem by using trade weighted 
scries has also been criticised for being arbitrary in terms of the choice of 
weights. In addition, it has the drawback that it implies that the relative 
importance of different countries’ prices in determining domestic prices 
changes if and only if, the trade pattern changes.
In the present application, a multi-country analysis in systems which 
account for the interractions of exchange rates and prices between more 
than two countries simultaneously is first attempted. Then, (in line with 
the “general to specific” methodology) reduced two-country systems are 
formally tested against the more general ones in terms of the robustness 
of the cointegration results. Finally, a bilateral analysis is performed in 
an attempt to test whether the results obtained confirm the multilateral 
analysis results.
2. The choice of the price index: Empirical studies considering 
PPP as an arbitrage relationship advocate the use of traded goods indices 
such as export prices or the wholesale price index. Studies taking into 
account the different pricing behaviour in goods and asset markets on the 
other hand, support the use of more general price measures such as the 
consumer price index, or the GDP deflator. In the present work, both ap­
proaches are followed, by using both consumer and wholesale price indices 
and the results are interpreted accordingly.
From a theoretical point of view, the pw is the adequate price measure 
to be used in the present work, given that the Greek asset market was 
relatively closed during the period under study. However, examination 
of the way in which the indices are computed reveals differences between 
the methodologies used to compile the pws in Greece and in the other 
countries, while this is not so for the p's. Similar household expenditure 
measures, rent and product prices are included for thepc compilation for all 
countries under study (see OECD (1994) supplement); the pc indices also 
cover similar geographical area and population (see IFS (1986) supplement, 
p. 217-219). On the contrary, the methodologies in which the pw s are 



























































































groups of industry commodities weighted in a quite judgmental way by 
the compilers of the national statistical institutions. The Greek wp for 
example, includes exported domestic goods, while this is not so for the 
indices of the rest of the countries. As a consequence, the pc index is 
a better comparable measure to test for PPP than the pw, in terms of 
measurement precision.
3. Endogeneity/ exogeneity status of the variables: The que­
stion is whether the price or the exchange rate series is the endogenous 
variable in the PPP relationship. The arbitrage based theory advocates 
exogenous prices (so it could be expected that this would hold in traded 
goods prices systems), while exogeneity for the exchange rates could only 
be supported by models taking into account the assets - goods markets 
forces interactions (therefore, more likely to be found in general price mea­
sure models). Contrary to most of the previous PPP empirical studies, 
including most of those using the Engle and Granger technique, applica­
tion of the Johansen maximum likelihood technique allows the endoge­
neity/ exogeneity status to be evaluated statistically, rather than imposed 
a priori.
3 The econometric Methodology
The analysis follows the "‘general to specific” methodology0. The basic ele­
ments of this methodology arc that the stochastic properties of the series of 
interest have to be accounted for, the measurement system (e.g. degree of 
aggregation) might influence the model specification, and that theoretical 
and observed variables may be two distinct concepts. In a systems con­
text, the initial step suggested by the methodology is the approximation 
of the joint distribution of an N x l vector of the time series of interest xt. 
(perhaps after transformation to ensure that linearity is reasonable) by a 
vector autoregressive representation (VAR) of the form: 5





























































































A(L)xt — n + v'Dt T i/t (3)
where ut ~  7A’ (0. E), // is a constant and D, contains conditioning variables 
such as scasonals. event dummy variables and relevant exogenous variables 
which influence only the short run behaviour of the process. In model (3):
A(L) = Z kj=oAjLJ =  I.x + A'(L)L.
which is a kth order matrix polynomial in the lag operator L with Ao=/.v. 
Also, {A j}  and E are unrestricted; the initial values X i x 2-t,..., Xo are 
fixed and k is finite, so that moving average components arc excluded. 
These assumptions, together with those about independence, normality 
and homosccdasticity. are not fundamental, while the assumption about 
constant parameters of interest {/r, A\,.... .4*, y>, E} is.
As long as a VAR of the form (3) is shown to be a congruent repre­
sentation of the available information for the variables of interest, (thus 
not rejecting the statistical assumptions underlying it), it can be used to 
test for the existence of cointegrating relationships among the series. In 
the case that they exist, the cointegrating relationships can then be used 
in the modelling, given that standard statistical inference can be made. In 
addition, they can be given the interpretation of equilibrium long run rela­
tionships among the included variables. Model (3) can be rcparametcrised 
in an error correction form as:
\ xt — — ^  *=i II, Ax(_i +  nr(_* +  n +  ipDt +  v (4)
where 11,- =  — (IN +  E)=lAj) and II =  — (/y  +  Ej_,.4j) =  —.4(1) and II is 
the matrix of the long-run responses. Then, and in the case that the series 
arc at most integrated of order one 1(1). the maximum likelihood technique 
suggested by Johansen(1988), Johansen and Juselius (1990) can be used 
to test for the rank of the matrix II, by computing two likelihood ratio test 
statistics, the “trace statistic'" and the “maximal eigenvalue statistic” .
If there exist r cointegrating relationships between the variables, II 
is of reduced rank r <X. In this case, II can be expressed as the product of 




























































































and a is the loadings or adjustment parameters matrix, which contains 
the loadings with which the cointegrating relationships enter the equations 
modelling Ax(.
The hypothesis of cointegration is given by:
Hoi : n  =  ad' (5)
Further, linear restrictions on either the parameters of the cointegrating 
vectors Pi or their loadings a, can be tested (which form hypthescs against 
H o i ) .  The importance of testing restictions on a, and d, in part stems 
from the fact that the matrices a  and d' are not unique: any linear trans­
formation of, say, d' by a nonsingular rxr matrix 0 , leaves II unchanged:
0/3' =  d" -+ — a 0 -10/3' =  n (6)
In this framework, restrictions on d which imply theoretical hypotheses for 
the long run behaviour of the series can be expressed as:
#02 : P = ~<i>, (7)
Certain zero restrictions on a can be expressed as:
#03 : a =  Arj) (8)
Zero restrictions on a are of importance given that they test whether or npt 
the cointegrating vectors enter the equations modelling the determination 
of the series. Therefore, certain zero restrictions on a are required fqr 
the weak exogeneity of the variables for the long run parameters6, while 
others suggest that a reduction of the initial system is robust in terms of 
the cointegration results. Finally, joint restrictions on d and a can also be 
formed as:
#04 : (a =  Ai-), (d =  =.<t>) (9)




























































































In (7), (8) and (9) the matrices E,\-Xs and A,\xm define known linear 
restrictions, while <psxr and v mxr incorporate the restrictions on the indi­
vidual values of the cointegrating space. Hypotheses of the forms (7), (8) 
and (9) can be assessed by a likelihood ratio test statistic of the form:
T j2 lo g {(  1 - A ‘ ) /(1 -A ,.) }  (10)
;= i
where A*. A; are the r largest eigenvalues of the restricted and the unre­
stricted model, respectively. The statistic is asymptotically distributed as 
a y2 with r(N  — s) degrees of freedom when testing for //o2- r(N  — rn) 
when testing for Hm. and r(N  — s) +  r(N  — m) when testing for H04.
4 The data set.
PPP is tested for Greece and its three major trading partners for the period 
examined: Germany (G ). France (FR) and Italy (IT). As shown in Table 
4.1, more than one third of Greece’s trade is with these three countries. 
Almost two thirds of the Greek imports are received from European coun­
tries. more than half of them from the EU members. Germany is the most 
important trading partner, accounting for approximately 18% of Greek 
total imports and 20%, of Greek total exports, followed by Italy (11%; of 
imports, 10%; of exports) and France (7%; of imports, 6.5%; of exports)7.
Quarterly seasonally unadjusted data for the post Brctton-Woods 
period 1975(1) to 1993(4) are used. The price scries arc IMF scries; they 
were all obtained using the DATASTREAM data bank. The drachma ex­
change rate and the Greek trade series were taken from the Greek Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Greece, various issues. The sample is 
shorter in a number of cases due to non availability of data8, and effective
7Those countries are followed by the US (6% of imports, 7% of exports) and the UK 
(5% of imports, 6% of exports), but extension of the analysis to test for PPP between 
Greece and the UK and the US is not attempted in the present work. It is done, though, 
in a bilateral framework in Sideris (1994).
8 For France, the wholesale price index is not available before 1980(2), and the Greek 




























































































estimation periods arc reduced so as to accomodate the lag structure of 
the estimated models.
Table 1: Trade with major trading partners (1975 - 1993)1.




All three countries 36 36.5
EEC countries 52 48
EEC k  OECD Europe 66 59
1Thc percentages are calculated using averages for the period 1975(1)- 
1993(4). Data arc taken from the Greek Monthly Statistical Bulletin of 
the Bank of Greece , various issues.
The variables used are the logs of the exchange rates of the drachma 
against the Deutsch mark eG , the Italian lira e/7 and the French franc 
epR and two alternative price measures, the consumer price index and the 
wholesale price index in Greece pcGR and pGR respectively, and in the six 
countries pj, p j. where /  denotes foreign country and takes the values G, 
IT, and FR for the countries Germany, Italy and France, respectively. The 
graphs of the scries are presented in Figure 4.1.
5 Testing for PPP in a multilateral frame­
work.
5.1 Specification of the VAR models.
In this first stage, the bilateral bias in PPP testing is dealt with by the 
specification of multicountry systems which model the price and exchange 
rate intcrractions among more than two countries simultaneously. In ad­




























































































prices of the domestic country's major trade partners, allowing the relative 
importance of the different countries prices in determining domestic prices 
to be directly determined from the data.
The initial aim was to test for PPP simultaneously between Greece 
and its three major competitors Germany, Italy and France, in four-country 
systems (seven-dimensional VARs) using the two alternative price index 
specifications. However, given the available sample period, analysis of 
seven dimensional VARs would mean loss of valuable degrees of freedom. It 
was therefore decided to do the analysis in five-dimensional VARs allowing 
for possible interrelations between Greece and two of its major partners at 
a time.
Four three-country VAR systems are estimated: (A) and (B) mo­
del simultaneously the price- exchange rates interrelations between Greece 
and: (a) Germany and France, and (b) Germany and Italy rcpcctively, 
using pc's; (C) and (D) model the price- exchange rate movements bet­
ween Greece and: (c) Germany and France, and (d) Germany and Italy, 
using pw's. Estimation is done by application of the multivariate least 
squares technique using five lags for the variables, with a constant and 
centred seasonals included in the deterministic variables set Dt9.
Likelihood ratio tests (provided there were non autocorrelated resi­
duals in the reduced systems) indicated the number of lags to be four in 
system (D) and five in the rest of the systems. All initial VARs rejected 
the null of normal residuals, possibly due to non-constant parameters as 
indicated by the plots of one-step Chow tests against the end point of the 
samples (not shown to save space). These features supported the inclusion 
of impulse dummy variables to account for the regime shifts/ structural 
breaks observed in the examined period, which (as advocated by Clements 
and Mizon (1991)) is preferable to an enlargement of the system.
In fact, two severe regime shifts in the form of two drachma deva­
luations took place during this period: the first one in January 1983, and 
the second one in October 1985. The second initially caused sharp rises in
9All results reported in the paper are obtained using the PC-GIVE and PC-FIML 





























































































Greek prices, with inflation reaching its highest point in the first quarter 
of 1986. The shift dummies D831 and D854 accounting for the first and 
second devaluations turned out to be significant in all systems, while their 
absence would have meant non normal residuals for the exchange rate and 
Greek price equations of them10. The dummy D924 which accounts for 
the withdrawal of major European currencies (including the Italian lira) 
from the ERM in September 1992, also had to be included in the Greek- 
German-Italian systems. Finally, a number of other specific dummies re­
lated to the performance of Greece’s trading partners were included in the 
relevant VARs; a description of the structural breaks which they account 
for is given in Appendix 1.
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 2 summarise the properties of the prefer­
red VARs residuals. The number of lags of the endogenous variables used 
and the variables contained in the D, set for each VAR arc given in the 
first lines of the tables.
First, single equation diagnostics are reported: The AR Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) statistic for residual serial independence across the men­
tioned lags of the autocorrelation function and the N  statistic testing the 
null of normal skewness and kurtosis. Second, test statistics for vector au­
toregressive residuals VecAR  and vector normality VecN  which make use 
of auxiliary systems to assess serial correlation and non normality in the 
VAR as a whole are reported (for definition of the tests, see Doornik and 
Hendry (1994)). The diagnostics do not indicate serious autocorrelation 
and non-normality problems for the VARs residuals. In a couple of equa­
tions, the hypothesis of either non autocorrelation or nonnormality of the 
residuals was marginally rejected. In addition, (with respect to the non 
normality evidence) since the Johansen technique has been demonstrated 
to be robust to nonnormality by Cheung and Lai (1993b) and Gonzalo 
(1994), it was decided to continue the analysis without altering the VAR 
specification.
10While tile shift dummies D832 and D8G1 which account also for the same effects 




























































































5.2.1 The Long-Run structure of the VAR system A.
The cointegration space rank.
Model (3) as specified in section 3 for a vector of the form:
x t =  {cfr-,cg-.Pg -,Pgr:Pcfr) with the required assumptions fulfilled as des­
cribed previously provides the framework to perform the multivariate coin- 
tegration analysis. Inspection of the graphs of the series shown in figure 1. 
indicate that the series have an approximate linear trend: therefore, model 
(3) is estimated without imposing the linear restriction of the constant to 
be included only in the cointegrating space. The outcomes of the maxi­
mum eigenvalue and trace statistics, the estimated eigenvectors and their 
loadings are reported in Table 5.1. Both likelihood ratio tests support the 
cointegrating space rank to be three, so we continue the analysis based on 
this assumption.
Finally, the robustness of the three cointegrating vectors is asses­
sed by visual examination of the graphs of the recursive estimates of the 
eigenvalues, given that they can be used as a valuable check for parame­
ter constancy (see Mizon (1995)). Their graphs given in figure 2 indicate 
parameter constancy of the cointegrating relations.
Identification of the Long Run structure.
The three estimated unrestricted cointegrating vectors seem to imply theo­
retically interprétable relations. In the first one. the exchange rates Cg and 
efit have coefficients which are almost equal in size, and have opposite si­
gns: the two variables together could be given the interpretation of the 
Deutsch mark/French frank exchange rate; in addition, the prGR coefficient 
is quite small in size, while the signs of the coefficients of the variables pG 
and prFR are the ones that could support a PPP relation between Germany 
and France. The second cointegrating vector could imply a PPP relation 
between Greece and Germany with coefficients quite close to unity. Finally, 





























































































Table 2: C oin tegration  analysis o f  sy ste m  ( A ) .
Testing for the IT rank.
Eigenvalues H0 Max. Eigen. 95% Trace 95%;
0.660 r =  0 76.75** 33.5 146.8** 68.5
0.360 r < 1 31.74* 27.1 70.07** 47.2
0.261 r < 2 21.49* 21.0 38.33** 29.7
0.195 r < 3 14.05 14.1 15.31 15.4
0.003 r < 4 0.267 3.8 0.267 3.8
Standardised eigenvectors.
£fr cg Ph Pgr Pfr
1 -0.924 0.064 -0.131 .0.553
-0.478 1 1.438 -0.731 -0.283
-1.052 0.219 1 1.664 -3.211
-1.094 -0.697 2.405 1 -1.256
-2.380 -1.021 -13.63 4.036 1
Adjustment coefficients.
CFR -0.458 0.077 0.034 0.028 0.001
c-g -0.064 0.041 0.009 0.066 0.001
Pc, -0.000 -0.007 0.014 -0.004 0.000
Pc,r -0.051 -0.022 -0.012 -0.011 0.004




























































































stage, even though the signs of the eFR, pcFR. praR variables could support 
a PPP link between Greece and France. Nevertheless, formal testing for 
possible theoretical assumptions is needed.
Table 5.2 presents the outcomes of a number of likelihood ratio sta­
tistics testing for alternative theoretical hypotheses concerning the speci­
fication of the three dimensional cointegrating space.
Hypotheses on a single cointegrating vector framework are initially 
considered. HAl assumes a "‘weak” PPP relation between Greece and Ger­
many for the specification of the second vector: it is accepted by the given 
data set. HA2 assumes “weak"’ PPP between Greece and France for the 
specification of the third vector: it is marginally rejected by the data. H .43 
which expresses a cointegrating long run relation between the Deutsch 
mark/ French frank exchange rate and the German and French prices for 
the first vector does not form a constraint. "Strong” PPP between Ger­
many and Greece implied by HA4 is accepted for the specification of the 
second vector. HAh testing for ‘‘strong" PPP between Greece and France 
for the specification of the third vector is accepted. Finally, which 
tests for “weak” PPP between Germany and France, even though accepted 
by the data set, does not provide a relation with the theoretically expected 
signs for the coefficients.
Ha7 tests jointly for HAl. HA2 and HA3: it is accepted by the given 
data sample.
H 48 tests jointly for HA4, HA2 and HA3: it is accepted.
Ha9 tests jointly for HA4. IIA2 and HA6\ it is strongly rejected by 
the data.
H 410 tests jointly for H 44. H,45 and HA3: even though it is accepted, 
it does not provide a theoretically reasonable relation for the specification 
of the first vector, as the obtained signs of the coefficients arc not the 
expected ones.
H 411 tests jointly for HM. HA5 and HA6: it is marginally rejected by 
the data.
As a consequence, the analysis was continued by assuming that the 




























































































Table 3: Testing system (A) for structural and exogeneity restric­
tions.
Testing restrictions on single vector specification.
X2(dof) p-value
£fr CG Pg Pgr Pfr
Ha i 0A2 0 1 a -a 0 3.414 (1) 0.064
Ha2 0A3 1 0 0 -b b 5.354 (1)* 0.020
Ha 3 Pa\ 1 -1 0 n a c
Ha* PA2 0 1 1 -1 0 4.584 (2) 0.101
Has 0A3 1 0 1 -1 0 4.652 (2) 0.097
Ha* 0A\ 1 -1 - C 0 C 3.364 (1) 0.066
Testing for joint restrictions.
X2(dof)  p-valuc
Hai: HAi n HA2n Ha3: 5.956 (2) 0.050
Has: Ha* n Ha2n Has: 6.713 (3) 0.081
Has: Ha4 n H A2 IT Has: 13.21 (4)** 0.010
Haio'- Ha* n Has n Has: 7.942 (5) 0.159
Hah : Ha4 n Has n Has: 14.77 (6)* 0.022
Testing for weak exogeneity restrictions.
X2{dof) p-valuc
H A12 Has^  w . exog. of PgR wrt ,3A2: 9.532 (4)* 0.049
Ha is HAHn w. exog. of pcG wrt 0A2: 7.170 (4) 0.127
Hai 4 HASD w . exog. of eG wrt 0A2: 9.571 (4)* 0.048
Hai s Hm C\ w . exog. of pcGR wrt 0As- 9.981 (4)* 0.040
Hais H AsD w. exog. of pcFR wrt 0A3: 7.456 (4) 0.113
Hau 77.,i8n w. exog. of eFR wrt 0A3: 7.098 (4) 0.130
Testing for reduction to bi-lateral systems.
Hais Hasn w. ex. of pcFR, eFR wrt 0A2%- 21.91 (5)** 0.000
Ha\s Ha8(T w . ex. of pcG, eG wrt Has- 10.326 (5) 0.066




























































































fication implied by H\s- The three cointegrating vectors are of the form 
(standard errors in parenthesis):
ftAi ■ (eFR -  eG) +  0.787(0.033)/^ -  0.852(0.080)/^
$A2 '■ e<v +  Pa ~ Pgr
ft a* : eFR -  0.962(0.017)(p .̂w -  pcFR)
,3a2 expresses a “strong” PPP relation between Greece and Germany, while 
ft a 3 a “weak” PPP relation between Greece and France, with coefficients 
very close to unity. Finally, the first vector 0a\ expresses a relation between 
the Deutsch mark/ French franc exchange rate and the French and German 
price indices, which is very close to a “weak” PPP relation between the 
two countries.
Weak exogeneity tests.
As shown in Johansen (1992). a necessary condition for Ax*, for some i, 
to be weakly exogenous for a and ft is that a* — 0. In that case, A x1( is 
weakly exogenous for a and ft in the sense that the conditional distribution 
of A x( given Ax,( as well as the lagged values of xt contains the parameters 
a and ft. whereas the distribution of Axu given the lagged xit does not 
contain the parameters n and ft.
Weak exogeneity tests are reported in the lower part of table 5.2. 
77.412, 77.413 and Hah test for weak exogeneity of pGR, pcG and eG respec­
tively, with respect to the parameters of the long run Greek-German strong 
PPP: weak exogeneity is rejected for eG and pGR. The results imply that 
while pa's are determined independently of the long run relationship that 
characterises the determination of the mark/drachma exchange rate, eG 
and pGR do not. Ham , Ham and Hah test for weak exogeneity of pcGR, 
prFR and cfr respectively, with respect to the vector expressing the “weak” 




























































































T estin g  for redu ction  to  bilateral sy ste m s.
Finally, a number of joint weak exogeneity assumptions that can be con­
sidered as necessary conditions for reduction to bi-lateral systems' cointe­
gration analysis are performed. Ha 19 tests whether the German variables 
are weakly exogenous with respect to the Greek-French PPP relationship 
and is accepted by the data set. However, HAis which tests whether the 
French variables are weakly exogenous with respect to the Greek-German 
PPP relationship is not accepted by the data set.
The results suggest that determination of the eFR is highly influenced 
by the long run movement of the < 0  rate. From a statistical point of view, 
they imply that while reduction to a bi-lateral Gcrman-Grcck system is 
allowed, the cointegrating relationship of the variables pcGR, pcFR and eFR 
necessitates modelling of the joint distribution of the complete system of 
the five variables. Finally Ha20 which tests for weak exogeneity of the 
German prices for the whole cointegration space is accepted by the given 
data set.
The data support PPP relationships between Greece and Germany 
and Greece and France. Between the two relationships, though, the Greek- 
German PPP seems to be the most robust one (implying that pcaR and 
cq move in a way to keep constant the competitiveness between the two 
countries). The Greek-French PPP seems to be a “secondary" relation­
ship explained probably by the EMS performance of the French currency 
(the fact that the French franc was linked to the mark for most of the 
period examined): eFR turns out to be weakly exogenous with respect to 
the Greek-French PPP but not with respect to the Greek-German PPP 
parameters of interest; in addition, the Greek-French PPP is shown to be 




























































































5.2.2 The Long-Run structure of the VAR system B. 
Determination of the cointegration space rank.
Application of the multivaratc cointegration technique on the Greek-German- 
Italian system as specified in the previous subsection (5.1) gave us the 
results presented in Table 4.16. The estimation was done again without 
imposing the restriction of the constant to lie in the cointegrating space, 
given that the series have a linear trend. Both likelihood ratio tests give 
evidence of two cointegrating relations. The two recursively estimated ei­
genvalues shown in figure 3 arc constant. Interpretation of the two long 
run relations is again not straightforward.
Identification of the long-run structure.
A number of theoretical hypotheses concerning the specification of the 
cointegrating space were tested formally. The outcomes of the likelihood 
ratio tests are given in the upper part of Table 5.4.
First, hypotheses on a single vector framework were tested. Hypo­
thesis Hgi tests for “weak” PPP between Greece and Germany and it is 
accepted by the given data set. Hypothesis Hb2 tests for unity coefficient 
for the drachma/lira rate and equal and opposite coefficients for the Greek 
and Italian prices, restrictions which could imply weak PPP between the 
two countries. Even though it is accepted by the given data set, the rela­
tion obtained is of the form en  — 19.61(pZ;fl/p j7) which does not express 
a “weak” PPP relation. Hbs tests for cointegration between the lira/mark 
rate and the German and Italian price indices (if accepted, it would mo­
tivate further investigation for “weak” PPP between Germany and Italy): 
it is strongly rejected by the data. HB4- which tests for PPP between 
Greece and a weighted average of the German and Italian price indices 
expressed in drachma terms, is also rejected by the given set. Hsh tests 
for cointegration between the price indices of the three countries and is 
accepted by the data. Finally, both Hb6 and HH7. which test for strong 





























































































Tabic 4: C oin tegration  analysis o f  sy ste m  (B).
Testing for the II rank.
Eigenvalues Ho Max. Eigen. 95% Trace 95%
0.673 *1 II o 68.28** 33.5 124.6** 68.5
0.404 r < 1 31.62* 27.1 56.27** 47.2
0.216 r <  2 14.87 21.0 24.85 29.7
0.147 r < 3 9.703 14.1 9.783 15.4
0.001 r < 4 0.080 3.8 0.080 3.8
Standardised eigenvectors.
Cit Pcgr CG Pg PCIT
1 -4.946 2.400 7.106 2.171
-1.350 1 0.315 -1.771 -0.622
-3.509 2.856 1 -0.579 -2.776
0.464 -0.256 -0.280 1 0.054
1.016 0.175 -1.156 -1.824 1
Adjustment coefficients.
cit 0.033 0.181 0.055 0.278 -0.0112
Pgr -0.019 -0.017 -0.022 -0.259 -0.0114
ec 0.022 0.210 0.034 0.413 -0.0134
Ph -0.022 -0.005 0.001 -0.030 -0.0001
PÏt -0.009 0.076 -0.010 -0.012 0.0004
Secondly, a few hypotheses concerning the structure of the two- 
dimensional cointegrating space were tested. Hgg tests jointly for Hg 1 
and Hgi\ Hgg tests jointly for Hg\ and HB3; Hg\o tests jointly for Hgi 
and HB4; Hbu tests jointly for HBi and Hgr>; finally, Hgu  tests jointly for 
Hg2 and Hg5; all but HBU were strongly rejected by the given data set. 
As a conccqucnce, it was decided to continue the analysis assuming that 
Hgu characterises the given data set. The two cointegrating vectors take 
the form (standard errors in parentheses):




























































































Tabic 5: Testing system (B) for structural and exogeneity restric­
tions.
Testing restrictions on single vectors specification.
X2(dof)  p-value
eir Pg cg Pgr Pit
H bi Pbi 0 a 1 -a 0 5.948 (2) 0.051
Hb2 @b i 1 0 0 -b b 3.903 (2) 0.142
Hb 3 PB2 1 -1 0 12.21 (1)** 0.000
HB4 Pb2 c d <1 1 c 4.820 (1)* 0.028
Hb5 &B2 0 1 0 a b 3.952 (1) 0.052
Hb6 &B2 0 1 1 -i 0 18.66 (3)** 0.000
HHi &B\ l 0 0 -i l 18.12 (3)** 0.000
Testing for joint restrictions.
X2(dof) p-value
Hgs: Hbi 61 Hb2 14.91 (3)** 0.001
HB9- Hbi H Hb3 14.24 (3)** 0.002
Hb un Hbi H Hb\ 23.53 (3)** 0.000
Hb u : Hb i H flgs 7.001 (3) 0.071
H B12 • HB2 H Hb5 13.80 (3)** 0.003
Testing for weak exogeneity restrictions.





Hb u - Hbi(~1weak exogeneity of cy, wrt TB1: 9.503 (2)** 0.008




























































































0B2 : pc,T +  2.811 (0.290 )/£  -  1.728(0.165)peGR
In the accepted structure, 0B\ expresses “weak” Greek-German PPP and 
pB2 a cointegration relationship among the price indices.
Tests for weak exogeneity.
The outcome of the weak exogeneity testing assuming the long run struc­
ture as specified by HBn, is given at the lower part of the Table 5.4. HBt3, 
Hbis and HBl4 test for weak exogeneity of the German prices, the Greek 
prices and the drachma/mark exchange rate respectively, with respect to 
the parameters of the first cointegrating vector: HB)3 is accepted by the 
data set, while HB4$ HBi5 are not: consistent with the results in system 
(A) analysis, German prices are the only exogenous variable in the Greek- 
German PPP relationship.
Concluding, we would say that there is evidence for “weak” PPP 
between Greece and Germany, while there is no evidence for “weak” PPP 
between neither Greece and Italy nor Germany and Italy11, results which 
probably reflect the EMS performance of the countries. Weak exogeneity 
with respect to the Greek-German PPP is accepted just for the German 
prices, result which is consistent with the system (A) analysis; the estima­
ted magnitude of the coefficients of the Greek-German weak PPP relation 
are, though, lower than the ones obtained in the system (A) and “strong" 
PPP is rejected. However, it should be remembered that in the present 
stage we identified a long run relationship between pGR, pG and cG, using 
a shorter sample period, than in the system (A) due to lack of Italian 
lira/drachma exchange rate series data.
11 The fact that there is evidence for a reintegrating relation which is very close to 
“weak” PPP between France and Germany, while such a relation cannot be supported 
between Italy and Germany is in accordance with the results obtained by Chen (1995), 
where he tests for PPP between EMS countries by testing for stationarity of a number 




























































































5.2.3 The Long-Run structure of the VAR system C.
The cointegration space rank.
Model (3) as specified in section 3 for a vector of the form:
x t — {cf r : cg -Vg -Pg r -P'f r ) provides the framework to perform the mul­
tivariate cointegration analysis. The outcomes of the maximum eigenva­
lue and trace statistics, the estimated eigenvectors and their loadings are 
reported in Table 5.5. Both two likelihood ratio tests support the cointe­
grating space rank to be three, so we continue the analysis based on this 
assumption. In addition, visual examination of the graph of the three re­
cursively calculated eigenvalues given in figure 4 provides evidence for the 
parameter constancy of the cointegrating relations.
Identification of the Long Run structure.
Even though some of the unconstrained eigenvectors seem to imply re­
asonable relations, formal testing is performed. Table 5.6 presents the 
outcomes of a number of likelihood ratio statistics testing for alternative 
theoretical assumptions concerning the specification of the three cointe­
grating vectors.
Assumptions on a single cointegrating vector framework arc followed 
by assumptions concerning the joint structure of the cointegrating space. 
Main assumptions tested are ‘‘weak'’ PPP between Greece and Germany, 
Greece and France, Germany and France. The assumptions implied by 
Hc7 arc finally shown to specify the structure of the three-dimensional 
cointegration space.
The three cointegrating vectors are of the form:
Pci : c-g — 0.871(0.032)(pqK — pg)
PC2 : eFR -  0.836(0.089)ef; +  0.588(0.078)p£R -  0.239(0.067)p£
He3 : eFR -  0.651(0.027)(p£fi -  p^R)
Pci expresses a “weak” PPP relation between Greece and Germany, while 




























































































Tabic 6: C oin tegration  analysis o f  sy ste m  (C ) .
Testing for the II rank.
Eigenvalues H0 Max. Eigen. 95% Trace 95%
0.736 r =  0 68.03** 33.5 148.8** 68.5
0.533 r <  1 38.87** 27.1 80.79** 47.2
0.404 r < 2 26.40** 21.0 41.91** 29.7
0.239 r < 3 13.98 14.1 15.30 15.4
0.029 r <  4 1.532 3.8 1.532 3.8
Standardised eigenvectors.
ec CFR Pg Pgr Pfr
1 1.201 4.585 -2.620 -0.090
-1.321 1 -1.427 0.495 0.611
0.322 0.012 1 -0.391 -0.148
-0.499 -0.434 -2.485 1 -0.013
-1.070 0.037 -3.938 1.107 1
Adjustment coefficients.
ec 0.565 0.240 -2.023 0.178 0.009
CFR 0.529 -0.202 -2.716 0.224 0.021
Pg -0.097 0.003 -0.060 0.032 0.007
Pgr 0.153 -0.053 -0.298 -0.038 0.051
Pfr -0.064 -0.146 0.913 0.160 0.008
presses a relation between the Dcutsch mark/ French frank exchange rate 
and the French and German price indices, which could imply a “weak0 
PPP relation between the two countries. The results reinforce the findings 
obtained in the system (A) analysis.
Weak exogeneity tests.
Weak exogeneity tests arc reported in the lower part of table 5.6. Consi­
stent with the system (A) results, cq turns out to be the only exogenous 




























































































Tabic 7: Testing system (C ) for structural and exogeneity restric­
tions.
Testing restrictions on single vectors specification.
\2(do/ ) p-value
CFR Pa r\wPgr Pfr
Hex' Hex- 0 1 a -a 0 4.700 (1)* 0.030
Hc2-. fiez'- 1 0 0 - b b 5.205 (1)* 0.022
H a - Pc2: 1 0 n a c
Hca-. 0C2 '■ 1 - 1 - C 0 C 5.192 (1)* 0.022
Testing for joint restrictions.
\2(dof) p-value
Ha : Hex n He;a • 12.211 (2)** 0.002
Hca'- Hc2 H Hcm'. 11.452 (2)** 0.003
Her- Hex n He2 n H er 5.208 (2) 0.074
H er Hex (~l He;2 H Hca'- 37.353 (3)** 0.000
Testing for weak exogeneity restrictions.
X2(dof) p-value
H er HeiCx w. exogeneity of p}’.R wrt 3ci • 10.382 (4)* 0.034
H c  xx He;7n  w. exogeneity of wrt 3c l '■ 9.485 (4) 0.050
Hex 2 HrnC w. exogeneity of wrt 3c-1 : 14.50 (4)** 0.005
Hex a Hr7C\ w . exogeneity of wrt /lea: 14.68 (4)** 0.005
Hex4 HeiCx w. exogeneity of wrt lea: 9.467 (4) 0.052
Hex 5 tfC7n w. exogeneity of eFR wrt 3c3: 32.19 (4)** 0.000
Testing for reduction to bi-lateral systems.
Hex 6 w. ex. of P/’/?, efft wrt 3ci: 24.45 (8)** 0.001




























































































bles with respect to the vector expressing the “weak" Frcnch-Greek PPP 
relationship is accepted just for the case of pcFR. Contrary to the system 
(A) results, weak exogeneity of eFR is also rejected.
Testing for reduction to bi-lateral systems.
Finally, testing for reduction to bi-lateral systems demonstrates that, even 
though this is feasible for the Greek-German system (in the margin though), 
this is not so for the Greek-French relationship.
5.2.4 The Long-Run structure of the VAR system D.
The cointegration space rank.
Cointegration analysis is performed on a wellspecified VAR for the vector 
of the form: x t — {cgtCfr -PgrtPg-P^r)- The outcomes of the maxi­
mum eigenvalue and trace statistics, the estimated eigenvectors and their 
loadings arc given in Table 5.7. There is evidence of two cointegrating rela­
tionship as supported by the trace likelihood ratio statistic, which arc also 
relatively constant as indicated by the recursively calculated eigenvalues 
shown in figure 5.
Identification of the Long Run structure.
Hypothesis testing results concerning the structure of the two cointegrating 
vector are reported in the upper part of table 5.8. Ho8 assumes jointly 
a “weak” PPP relation between Greece and Germany for Poi and a non- 
specified cointegrating relationship between ca- cf-p, Pc, and p'fT for hn- It 
is accepted with the highest p-valuc by the given data set and, therefore, 
the analysis is continued based on this specification.
Weak exogeneity tests.
Weak exogeneity tests arc reported in the lower part of table 5.9: Hog- 




























































































Table 8: C oin tegration  analysis o f  sy ste m  (D ).
Testing for the 11 rank.
Eigenvalues H0 Max. Eigen. 95% Trace 95%
0.5491 r =  0 48.59** 33.5 112.5** 68.5
0.4801 r < 1 39.90** 27.1 63.87** 47.2
0.2496 r < 2 17.52 21.0 23.96 29.7
0.0957 r < 3 6.143 14.1 6.443 15.4
0.0049 r < 4 0.300 3.8 0.300 3.8
Standardised eigenvectors.
CG C[T nwPg Pgr PÏT
1 -0.236 3.981 -0.644 -1.379
8.400 1 42.37 -8.049 -11.28
-0.223 0.169 1 0.226 -0.561
-0.108 -0.864 -1.933 1 -0.251
-0.222 0.194 -1.406 -0.219 1
Adjustment coefficients.
CG -0.022 0.015 0.581 0.021 0.034
e j j -0.019 0.029 0.054 0.065 0.081
Pg -0.005 -0.013 -0.040 0.006 0.008
Pgr 0.117 -0.002 -0.038 -0.136 0.038
pYt 0.246 -0.019 -0.026 0.012 0.014
respect to the parameters of the “weak’' Greek-German PPP. Consistent 
with the analysis of the previous systems, weak exogeneity is not rejected 
just for the case of p'£.
5.3 Interpretation of the results.
The results obtained in the first stage of testing for PPP in a multilateral 
framework are indicative of the way Greek exchange rates and prices were 
determined during the period examined. First of all, there is evidence for 




























































































Table 9: Testing system (D) for structural and exogeneity restric­
tions.
Testing for structural restrictions.
xHdof) p-value
ÊG ejT Pgr Pa Pit
HDl: 0DI 1 0 -a a 0 3.422 (2) 0.180
Hd2- 0DX 0 1 -b 0 b 12.09 (2)** 0.002
HD3: 0D2 0 0 1 -c -d 2.546 (1) 0.110
Hd 4: 0D2 1 -1 0 a L 0.012 (1) 0.912
Hm : 0D2 1 a 0 b c n a c
Hm : pDl 1 0 -1 1 0 29.69 (3)** 0 .0 00
Testing for joint restrictions.
Hot-
Hm :
Hd 1 H Hd3: 
Hd 1 n HD5'-






Testing for weak exogeneity restrictions.
X2(d of) p-value
Hm: Hd\ 0  w. exogeneity of Cq wrt 0d i- 7.396 (2)* Q.Q24
Hdxo- Hdi f~l w. exogeneity of PqR wrt Pox'- 7.716 (2)* 0.021




























































































long run behaviour of all three exchange rates cG, epR and cj-p in most of 
the systems. This is consistent with these European countries being the 
three main trading partners of Greece with special trading agreements, 
especially after Greece became an EEC member in January 1981. Moreo­
ver, from March 1979. the EMS mechanism existed, according to which 
the participating countries had to maintain the market exchange rates of 
their currencies against the ECU (essentially the Deutsch mark) within 
particular bands, for mainly antiinflationary reasons12.
However, joint testing of the hypotheses revealed that:
a) The strongest relationship is the one implying “weak” PPP bet­
ween Greece and Germany. Such a relationship is supported by all three- 
country systems using the two alternative price indices13. The result is 
easily interpreted given that Germany has been the largest trading part­
ner of Greece for the period under consideration, with the Deutsch Mark 
being the most powerful European currency. In the relationship, Greek 
prices and the eG are the endogenous variables with respect to the long 
run parameters. The status of the variables indicates that, during the pe­
riod, the exchange rate moved in a way to keep Greece’s competitiveness 
against Germany relatively constant, while influencing Greek price forma­
tion. The strength of the relationship is also verified by the fact that it 
can be identified in reduced two-country systems as shown by relevant 
weak exogeneity tests. Finally, as indicated by the recursively estimated 
eigenvalues, the relationship has constant parameters.
b ) A constant parameter “weak” PPP is also accepted between Greece 
and France in the two relevant systems, in which, though, there is also evi­
dence for a cointegrating long run relationship very close to “weak” PPP 
between Germany and France. In addition, in both systems (systems (A) 
and (C)), the French variables arc not weakly exogenous with respect to 
the parameters of the estimated weak Greek-German PPP; in other words,
12Greece did not participate in the EMS. even though the drachma was added to the 
ECU basket in September 1984.
l3The weak PPP hypothesis is accepted obtaining different coefficient values in dif­
ferent systems, and in system (A) even “strong” PPP is accepted, but this can be due 




























































































the Greek-French PPP is identified only when analysis of the joint distri­
bution of the variables is performed. The results indicate that the •‘weak" 
PPP between Greece and France is a “secondary” relation caused by the 
fact that both countries tried to keep relatively constant competitiveness 
against Germany, and that the franc was strongly linked to the Deutsch 
mark.
c) There is no evidence for “weak” PPP between Greece and Italy, 
a result which at first seems strange, given that Italy is more important a 
trading partner of Greece than France. The result, however, reinforces the 
interpretation given above for the French case. This interpretation seems 
reasonable if, in addition, we take into account that there is no evidence 
for weak PPP between Germany and Italy14, and the fact that the French 
franc was for the whole EMS period participating in the ERM mechanism 
within lower bands (2.25% on each side of the central parity against ECU) 
than the Italian currency (6% on each side of the central parity).
The multilateral analysis gave evidence for two weak PPP relation­
ships, revealing at the same time relationships between the variables of 
the system which were out of the initial scope of the analysis. In addition, 
it indicated that there is no scope for testing for PPP in a bilateral fra­
mework in any but the Greek-German case. It was decided, however, to 
continue the analysis in bi-lateral systems for the sake of curiosity.
6 Testing for PPP in a bilateral framework.
6.1 Specification of the VAR models.
In a second stage, PPP is tested between Greece and each of its three 
major trading partners, in a two country system framework. To this end. 
six three-dimensional VAR systems for the three exchange rates using the 
two alternative price indices which analyse vector processes of the form 
z* — (e .p .p j) arc formulated. The estimated VARs allow for a set of




























































































conditioning variables, Dt: a constant and seasonal dummies for all YARs 
and different impulse dummy variables, to account for different regime 
shifts that characterise the performance of the different economies. Once 
the VARs are shown to be congruent, the Johansen technique estimates 
the number of the stationary linear combinations of the variables of the 
form:
7ie+72P + 73P/ (O)
In the case that there is evidence of one stationary relationship (one 
cointegrating vector) among the variables, the theoretical restrictions of 
interest can be assessed. The first theoretical assumption Hi to be tested 
for, is that expressed by the '‘weak'’ PPP version allowing for transporta­
tion costs/ measurement errors as formalised in (2). This implies jointly 
the restrictions:
H\ : 7 i =  I . - 7 2  =  7s(= 7) (12)
Finally, and in the case that the assumption Hi has not been rejected, 
the “strong” PPP version (1) can be assessed by testing for H2 which 
implies jointly the restrictions:
H2 ■ 7i =  1,72 — —1 ,73  — 1- (13)
All six VARs were initially estimated by applying multivariate least 
squares using five lags of the variables (k=5). First of all, none of the initial 
5th order systems presented autocorrelatcd residuals. However, the final 
number of lags of the endogenous variables used for each estimated VAR 
was specified by sequential testing of the initial systems against specifica­
tions of lag length k-1 by means of the likelihood test, until the shorter 
lag length k-1 was rejected against some value of k, provided there were 
non autocorrelatcd residuals in the estimated reductions. Therefore, the 
number of lags used finally for each VAR system was: five lags for the 




























































































Table 10: Bilateral systems’ eigenvalues.
VARs using pw's.
zt =  (e, p ), p ,̂R) 
Germany 0.261 0.122 0.016
Italy 0.481 0.167 0.009
France 0.486 0.138 0.006
VARs using pc's
zt =  (c, p). pcGR) 
Germany 0.230 0.068 0.000
Italy 0.296 0.049 0.016
France 0.257 0.163 0.012
the German VAR using pc,s; four lags for the rest of the systems. Nor­
mality problems indicated a number of dummies to be included in Dt to 
account for specific regime shifts that characterise the examined period, 
shown (also) by Chow tests for parameter constancy. The events that the 
dummies account for are described in Appendix 1.
Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 2 summarise the properties of the final 
systems' residuals obtained by the VARs using p'"'s. and the VARs using 
pc,s, respectively. The number of lags of the variables used and the va­
riables contained in the D( set for each system arc mentioned in the first 
lines of the tables. Single equation diagnostics arc first reported, followed 
by the diagnostics for the VARs residuals. They do not indicate serious 
autocorrelation, and non-normality problems for any of the cases.






























































































Tabic 11: T w o -c o u n try  V A R s  C oin tegration  A n aly sis .
95%
Maxim, 
r =  0 
21.0
eigenv. 
r < 1 
14.1
r < 2 
3.8
Trace 
r =  0
29.7
r < 1 
15.4
r <  2 
3.8
VARs using pw's
Germany 21.49* 9.25 1.20 31.95* 10.46 1.20
Italy 31.49** 8.82 0.04 40.36** 8.870 0.04
France 34.02** 7.57 0.31 41.91** 7.880 0.31
VARs using pc's
Germany 21.14* 5.25 0.02 26.82 5.280 0.02
Italy 21.83* 3.11 1.00 25.95 4.110 1.00
France 21.11* 12.7 0.91 34.71* 13.61 0.91
Model (3) for a vector of the form z< =  (c .p .p j) is the starting point of 
the cointegration analysis. Given that the exchange rate and price series 
have a linear trend, evidence consistent with the assumption of constant 
nominal price growth, the analysis is again continued without imposing the 
constant to lie in the cointegrating space in all VARs. Table 6.1 presents 
the obtained eigenvalues while table 6.2 reports the outcomes of the two 
likelihood ratio tests testing for the cointegration rank r of the matrix II 
for the six systems.
There is evidence of one cointegrating relationship for all systems. 
Table 6.4 reports the unrestricted form of the eigenvectors accepted to 
express stationary relationships, normalized with the value corresponding 
to the nominal exchange rate and the adjustment coefficients for each ac­
cepted eigenvector. The eigenvectors of all but the French system using 
pw's emerge as having coefficients with the theoretically expected sign and 




























































































Table 12: Two-country VARs cointegrating vectors and adjust­
ment coefficients.
Coint. Vector Adjust. Cocff.
VARs using pw,s.
e Pf PqR const c Pf Pgr
Germany i 1.830 -1.091 -0.07 0.22 -0.84
Italy i 1.880 -1.560 0.02 0.05 -0.00
France i -0.602 -0.671 -0.16 0.00 0.00
VARs using pc,s
e Pcf Pcgr C Pi Pgr
Germany i 2.098 -1.136 -0.12 -0.02 0.02
Italy i 3.362 -1.143 -0.00 0.06 0.01




























































































Tabic 13: Tests for structural restrictions on the cointegrating 
vectors of the two-country systems.
Hypothesis H, 1 Restricted H2 2
Test Statistic \2(1) coint. vector y2(2)
VARs using pw's
(c , pf-, Pg r)





( c > P°f, Pg r )
(1, 0.924, -0.924) 15.79**
Italy 8.71**
France 0.73 (1, 0.867, -0.867) 6.142*
1 Hi tests for ‘‘weak” PPP
2 H2 tests for “strong” PPP
Testing for PPP as a structural restriction.
The next step is to test for the restrictions implied by the “weak” PPP 
version as expressed by the hypothesis Hi, by applying the likelihood ratio 
test given by (10). The results are reported in the first column of table 
6.4. The restrictions that Hi implies are accepted for the following VAR
systems:
Both VARs modelling the determination of the Deutsch mark/ drachma 
exchange rate <y; using pu’\s and p‘"s: the restriction is, though, just mar­
ginally accepted with a p: 0.0145 (rejected at a 5C7 but not at a 1% level 
of significance) for the system using pc's. The accepted relationships arc 




























































































eG =  0 .8 5 7 (0 .0 3 7 )^ - p g )  
cq — 0.924(0.021)(pqH — pcG)
The system modelling the French franc exchange rate using pc's. with 
accepted weak PPP relationship of the form:
pfr =  0.867(0.039)(pqR -  pcFR)
For all accepted cointegrating relationships the magnitude of j  is close 
to unity, which evidence implies that they possibly express PPP relation­
ships. For the rest of the VAR systems the weak PPP restriction of equal 
coefficients and opposite signs for the price variables was strongly rejected.
The next step is to test for the restrictions of the strong PPP implied 
by hypothesis H2, in the cases where the proportionality assumption is not 
rejected. The results arc given in the third column of table 6.4. The 
restrictions were rejected for all cases.
Finally, the robustness of the three obtained weak PPP relations is 
assessed by visual examination of the graphs of the recursive estimates 
of the eigenvalues of the three systems. They are presented in figure 6. 
They arc constant for all but the French system thus casting doubt on the 
validity of its results. The Greek-German using both indices PPP relations 
are, therefore, the two most robust relations that come out of the bi-lateral 
analysis.
Weak exogeneity tests.
The weak exogeneity status of the variables with respect to the long run 
parameters of interest is tested for the cases where the weak PPP hypo­
thesis is not rejected by the given data sets. The results are reported in 
table 6.5.
In the Greek-German system using pc's, weak exogeneity for the ex­
change rate variable is rejected, while weak exogeneity for Greek prices is 
accepted (even though marginally), in contrast to the multilateral systems 
(A) and (B). Rejection of the weak exogeneity for the Cfn with respect 




























































































Table 14: Testing for weak exogeneity restrictions.
Hypothesis \2 (dof) p-value
a. Testing the Greek - German pw system
H„i: w. exogeneity for pg: 6.365 (3) 0.095
Ha2: w. exogeneity for p 9.908* (3) 0.019
Ha3: w. exogeneity for c^: 9.186* (3) 0.026
b. Testing the Greek - German pc system
H6i: w. exogeneity for p^: 7.508 (3) 0.057
H(,2: w. exogeneity for pgfl: 7.437 (3) 0.059
H(,3: w. exogeneity for cq: 15.054** (3) 0.001
c. Testing the Greek - French pc system
H î: w. exogeneity for p5rfi: 4.452 (3) 0.216
Hr2: w. exogeneity for Pgr: 7.884 (3)* 0.048




























































































(A); however, the result of the particular bi-lateral system is not of great 
importance given that the cointegrating vector docs not seem to have con­
stant parameters. Finally, in the Greek-German system using pw's the 
assumptions for weak exogeneity for the Greek prices and the exchange 
rate are rejected, which result is consistent with both multilateral systems 
(C) and (D).
6.3 Interpretation of the results.
The findings obtained at this second stage verified the implications made 
based on the results obtained in the multi-lateral analysis: The "weak" 
PPP doctrine is accepted for both VARs modelling Greek-German trade 
interrelations. “Weak” Greek-French PPP is accepted in the system using 
pc,s. However, given that the pc,s cointegrating relationship docs not have 
constant parameters as indicated by the recursive eigenvalues graph and 
that “weak” PPP is not accepted in the pw's system, the result is quite in­
conclusive. “Weak” PPP is not accepted for the drachma/ Italian systems 
using both price indices. Finally, the “strong” PPP version is rejected for 
all cases tested. Summarising, even though there is evidence for a coin­
tegrating relation between prices and exchange rates between Greece and 
its three main trading partners, the robust “weak” PPP relationships have 
been identified in the Greek-German systems using both price indices.
The bi-lateral analysis findings confirm mainly the ones obtained in 
the multi-lateral one, leaving though a number of questions (Greek-French 
PPP, exogeneity status of variables in the two Greek-German PPP relati­
ons) unanswered . In addition, no possible explanations for the behaviour 
of the series are implied.
7 Conclusions
In the present paper, the PPP hypothesis between Greece and its three 
major trading partners was tested using the Johansen multivariate cointe­




























































































between the long run relations and short run dynamics and for adjustment 
for structural breaks. A basic aim of the work was also to investigate the 
implications that problems related with the empirical PPP literature have 
for the analysis. Therefore, the PPP hypothesis was tested in a multi­
lateral and a bi-lateral framework, using two alternative price indices and 
without imposing a priori any endogenous/exogenous status for the varia­
bles.
The basic theoretical results are:
There is evidence for long-run weak PPP between Greece and Ger­
many and between Greece and France. PPP with Germany is supported 
by all systems (multi-lateral as well as bi-lateral), using the two alternative 
indices and can, therefore, be considered as a robust relationship. Howe­
ver, PPP with France can be seen as a “secondary” relationship supported 
mainly by the multi-lateral systems in which PPP between Germany and 
France is also indicated. The results imply that Greece tried to preserve 
constant competitiveness mainly with Germany which is its most import­
ant trade partner with a currency that dominated the European countries 
(which also account for almost the two thirds of the Greek trade). On the 
other hand, the Greek-French PPP can be seen as a result of the fact that 
France tried also to preserve constant competitiveness with Germany, and 
that the French franc was strongly linked to the Dcutsch mark through 
the ER\1 mechanism for most of the period.
With respect to the empirical PPP studies problems:
i) The multilateral analysis gave evidence for two weak PPP relation­
ships with constant parameters. At the same time, it revealed relationships 
between the variables of the system which were beyond the initial scope 
of the analysis, which helped interpretation of the main results. In addi­
tion, it indicated that there is no scope for testing for PPP in a bilateral 
framework in any but the Greek-German case. Bi-lateral analysis mainly 
confirmed the multi-lateral findings, but provided also contradictory re­
sults. Therefore, analysis based only in bi-lateral systems, would have 
been rather inconclusive.




























































































cation of the main long-run relationships (especially in (and probably due 
to) the multilateral analysis); there were minor differences between the pr's 
and the pw's systems with respect to the determination of the exogeneity 
status of the variables, probably indicating differences in measurement, or 
the industry structure of the different economics.
iii) Finally, the exogeneity status of the exchange rates and the Greek 
prices was rejected in most cases for which PPP was identified. Both results 




























































































APPENDIX 1: Definition of the regime shift dummy 
variables.
Dummies to account for breaks related to the performance of the 
Greek economy:
• D831: 1 in 1983:1: 0 otherwise: In January 1983 the Greek drachma 
is devalued by 15,5%.
• D843: 1 in 1984:3; 0 otherwise: In September 1984, drachma is added 
to the European Currency Unit.
» D854: 1 in 1985:4; 0 otherwise: In October 1985 measures for a 
stabilization package include a drachma devaluation by 15%.
Dummies that enter the French VARs:
• D771: 1 in 1977:1; 0 otherwise: A liberalisation of the goods prices 
(which were frozen in the previous months ) and VAT change take 
place in January 1977.
• D801: 1 in 1980:1; 0 otherwise: In France, energy prices and oil 
products prices rise sharply in January 1980, as a result of the second 
oil price shock, which took place at the begining of 1979.
• D822: 1 in 1982:2; 0 otherwise: In June 1982, a realignment of the 
French franc in the EMS takes place (The French franc depreciates 
by 6%).
• D852: 1 in 1985:2; 0 otherwise: At the beginning of 1985 a number of 
price control measures were lifted, with the fuel and automobile price 
controls lifted in February and July 1985 respectively.
Dummies that enter the German VARs:
• D791: 1 in 1979:1; 0 otherwise: To account for the sharp rise in the 
prices of oil products.
• D803: 1 in 1980:3; 0 otherwise: To account for a temporary fall in 




























































































• D814: 1 in 1981:4; 0 otherwise: A realignment of 5.5 % of the Deutsch 
mark in the EMS takes place in October 1981.
Dummies that enter the Italian VARs:
• D801: 1 in 1980:1; 0 otherwise: Public services and energy prices rise 
in January 1980 in order to accomodate the second oil price shock.
• D911: 1 in 1991:1; 0 otherwise: In .January 1991. public spending 
cuts as decided in the state budget and a wage freezing accord had 
as a result a fall in inflation.
• D924: 1 in 1992:4; 0 otherwise: Withdrawal of the Italian lira from 




























































































A P P E N D I X  2 : D iagn ostics o f  the V A R  sy ste m s.
Tabic l:Diagnostics of the multi-country VARs using pc’s .
A) Greek- German- B) Greek- German-
French VAR Italian VAR
Sample: 1976.2-1993.4 1978.4-1993.4
Dummies D854. D822. D852. D854, D801, D911.
in Dp. D831. D832, D843. D831, D832, D924.
Lags used: 5 5
Equations residuals tests
AR F(.,.) F(5.31) F(4. 23)
(cr. value « 2.52 ) 2.80
eG: 1.190 eG: 1.198
Cpn‘. 1.060 Cjj\ 2.783
Pcgr: 0-987 PhR■ 1-034
pcG: 1.989 tfG. 3.90*
PrfR : 1-255 pcIT: 2.062
X \2 (2) (cr.value: 5.99)
e.G: 3.11 eG: 4.272
c fr • 5.177 cjt'. 2.953
Pg r '- 2.454 Pg r■ 1034
pcCw: 2.670 pcG: 1.461
f FR-. 0.481 pcIT: 3.512
VARs residuals tests
Vcc AR F(.,.)i F(125, 39) F(100. 19)
(cr. value ss 1.58 1.70 )
0.998 1.389





























































































Tabic 2: D iagn ostics o f  the m u lti-cou n try  V A R s  using pu” s.
C) Greek- German- 
French VAR
D) Greek- German- 
Italian VAR
Sample: 1981.2-1993.4 1978.4-1993.4
Dummies D854. D861, D854. D911. D924.
in Dt: D831, D822. D831, D832.
Lags used: 5 4
Equations residuals tests
AR F(.,.) F(3, 15) F(4. 28)
(cr. value « 3.29 2.78
eG: 3.807* eG: 2.050
cpr\ 2.013 e]T: 1.225
P%r- 3-256 Pgr- 2.696
pg: 1.670 pg: 2.782
PWFR: 3.197 pgr : 2.677
X x2 (2) (cr.valuc: 5.99)
eG: 0.387 eG: 1.802
2.425 e ,T: 3.311
Pg r- 1-758 pg*: 2.383
pg: 8.516* pg: 1.319
Pp r - 0.200 pfT: 4.569
VARs residuals tests
Vcc AR F( F(.,.) F(100, 43)
(cr. value ~ 1.60 )
n a 1.499





























































































Tabic 3: D iagn ostics o f  th e tw o-cou ntry  V A R s  using p w ,s .
Germany Italy France
Sample: 1976.2-1993.4 1978.1-1990.1 1981.2-1993.4
Dummies D854, D831, D854. D831. D854. D861,
included D791, D814. D831, D832,
in D<: D822.
Lags used: 5 4 4
Equation residual tests
AR F(.,.) F(5. 43) F(4. 29) F(4. 26)
(cr. value « 2.43 2.70 2.74
e 2.30 1.558 2.927*
Pgr 1.23 0.408 0.047
Pi 0.69 0.346 1.296
N x2 (2) (cr.value: 5.99)
e 0.04 2.907 4.337
Pgr 3.12 0.219 0.228
Pi 0.01 0.019 1.898
VAR residual tests
Vec AR F(.,.) F(45, 92) F(36. 56) F(36. 48)
(cr. value « 1.50 1.65 1.62
1.02 1.0752 1.547





























































































Table 4: D iagn ostics o f  th e tw o -co u n try  V A R s  using pc,s.
Germany Italy France
Sample: 1975.3-1993.4 1978.3-1993.4 1976.1-1993.1
Dummies D854. D861, D79L D854. D831. D854. D831.
included D831. D832. D801. D801. D924. D823, D832.
in D(: D924, D931. D801.
Lags used: 3 4 5
Equation residual tests
AR F(.,.) F(5, 48) F(4. 37) F(5. 42)
(cr. value « 2.43 2.62 2.42
c 1.185 0.755 1.243
Pgr 3.217* 0.459 0.516
PCf 1.113 1.383 0.580
X x 2 (2) (cr.value: 5.99)
e 5.686 3.899 4.991
Pgr 1.948 4.701 4.558
P°f 2.443 1.490 2.889
VAR residual tests
Vec AR F(..,.) F(45,107) F(36. 80) F(45. 89)
(cr. value ft: 1.51 1.60 1.54
1.071 0.997 1.042
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